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SUMMARY OF  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Serious reservations have been expressed by Visegrad states about the need and 
probability of aligning their consular and visa policies towards Ukraine and 
Moldova so as to facilitate the travel of their eastern neighbours. In fact, the most 
direct form of alignment was observed between two states, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, which in 2000 introduced more restrictive regulations ahead of the two 
other states in the group. It is notable that these states do not consider themselves as 
their most likely partners for adapting visa policy but either seek the support and the 
co-operation of other EU Member States (e.g. Germany for Poland or Austria for 
Hungary) or are waiting for EU-level solutions (e.g. the initiative to create a 
European diplomatic service by November 2006 or the adoption of the draft Council 
Regulation on local border traffic). (A notable exception was the Hungarian initiative 
raised at the November 2004 Salzburg Forum concerning the future possibility of 
sharing one another’s visa issuing consulates.)1 
 
Since visas were introduced, most activities aimed at facilitating travel have been 
national in character (e.g. the local cross-border traffic arrangement between Slovakia 
and Ukraine since March 2001, reciprocal moves by the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
towards Ukraine and by Poland towards Moldova, resulting in de facto asymmetric 
visa policies as of April/May 2004, the introduction of longer-term Polish visas for 
Ukraine, and Hungary's facilitation of visa traffic of Ukrainian nationals in October 
2004). Although following Ukraine’s recent goodwill measures towards the EU all 
the Visegrad states maintain facilitated conditions for obtaining their visas for the 
Ukrainian citizens, differences in the approach to the form and purpose of 
introduction of visas persist among the four Visegrad states. Observation of the 
manner in which more restrictive policies were imposed and are implemented 
reveals two distinct groups. On the one hand, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
introduced visas earlier, citing EU accession requirements and stressing the security 
aspect of visas. On the other hand, Hungary and Poland delayed visa obligations for 
Ukraine and sought customised solutions (free Polish visas for Ukraine and later for 
Moldova, free Hungarian visas for Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro). As a result, 
despite superficial similarities, current national visa policy arrangements vary far 
more (especially in terms of implementation) among the four states than they did in 
either 2000 or 2003. 
 
Differences at policy level reflect some deep disparities in the approach towards 
visas as policy instruments and towards eastern neighbours. Firstly, two contrasting 
positions could be noted as regards the purpose and administration of visas. One 
position, close to that of most EU Member States and the Commission itself, was 
adopted by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which makes the visa-issuing process 
the first barrier against potential illegal immigrants and requires that the applicant 
                                            
1 However, co-operation in this field is suggested to start first between Hungary and Austria and later be 
extended to the other members of the Salzburg Forum (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia).  
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must prove his or her good intentions during the interview. This approach is far 
from making visas widely available and instead clearly and narrowly defines the 
profile of ‘safe’ or desirable applicants (e.g. residents of the immediate 
neighbourhood or workers in certain labour niche markets). The states adopting this 
approach are concerned about the impact on labour markets and about potential 
transit migration. 
 
On the other hand, Poland (and to a lesser extent Hungary) adopted a contrasting 
position, which could be compared to recent German practice, according to which 
visas are not so much a tool to fight criminality but instruments of foreign policy. 
These two states are responsible for some of the longest stretches of the external EU 
border and have been at the forefront of tightening border controls. At the same time, 
they introduced asymmetric policies for their non-EU neighbours by granting visas 
free of charge (Poland for Ukraine and Hungary for Ukraine and Serbia and 
Montenegro). Thus, these two states on the one hand sought support from the EU for 
improving border controls and on the other invested in the expansion of their 
consular network (there are five Polish and three Hungarian consulates in Ukraine, 
and, unlike the Czech Republic or Slovakia, both states have representations in the 
Republic of Moldova).2 It could be concluded that Poland and Hungary have been 
able to demonstrate that their liberal visa policies vis-à-vis their neighbours are 
compatible with their efforts at effective border controls, and that the assurance of 
tight controls on the external EU border allows some flexibility in visa 
administration, something which is recognised by the EU. 
 
The choice of either approach has followed a given state’s foreign policy priorities. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia (since 1998) clearly put primacy on fast accession 
to the EU, subordinating relations with Ukraine or the CIS in general insofar as they 
could be in conflict with the EU agenda. In contrast, Hungary, and especially Poland, 
played a balancing act between two priorities: EU integration and relations with non-
EU neighbours (although EU integration was also a priority for them). Thus, as 
opposed to the Czech Republic or Slovakia, Hungary and Poland undertook lengthy 
consultations with their neighbours prior to introducing visas to work out solutions 
which would prevent a dramatic decline in traffic. The fact that these two states are 
the only EU members to maintain an asymmetric policy with Ukraine is testimony to 
their belief that there is a place for national policies vis-à-vis their neighbours, apart 
from those within the EU framework. The two states also presented their proposals 
for amending the Union’s neighbourhood policies at different times. 
 
These different assumptions place limitations on chances for explicit harmonisation 
of the position between the four countries in visa and consular affairs. The Czech 
Republic and Slovakia have consistently affirmed that any co-operation in JHA 
should be conducted within the EU framework, and have generally been content 
with the Commission’s proposal for the European Neighbourhood Policy. These two 
countries are likely to continue stressing the need to subordinate national visa 
                                            
2 However, since EU accession, the Czech Republic has been considering opening an additional consular post in 
Ukraine and establishing a consulate in Moldova. 
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policies to the overarching objective of being integrated into the Schengen zone and 
cannot be expected to liberalise their restrictive policies in the spirit of the Polish and 
Hungarian arrangements. It should be pointed out that Slovakia expressed a will to 
achieve at least some liberalisation, although to a definitely lesser extent than that 
found in solutions practised by either Poland or Hungary. 
 
On the other hand, Poland and Hungary have their own particular reasons for 
adopting more liberal solutions, which are not necessarily directly transferable to the 
two other Visegrad states. Their position may be justified by the fact that 
membership of the Visegrad Group never implied a common stance on visa policy 
and any consultations were limited to exchanging information and facilitating EU 
integration and, recently, preparations for Schengen accession. Poland and Hungary 
introduced their more liberal policies separately and were motivated by different 
reasons. Of the two states, Poland adheres to the notion of a comprehensive ‘eastern 
foreign policy’, covering on the one hand Russia and on the other Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine. Hungary lacks such a broad concept, concentrating its efforts on 
relations with its neighbours in the Carpathian Basin (in particular Slovakia, Ukraine, 
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia). This may explain why only Poland 
extended the preferential, asymmetric solution to Moldova and, in turn, why the 
issue of local border traffic was of somewhat more interest to Hungary. Poland 
underlined the special status for its neighbour, confirmed by Warsaw’s support for 
Ukraine’s EU membership. As a result, Warsaw was interested in covering Ukraine 
as a whole with a network of its consulates, something which was reinforced not 
only in the immediate neighbourhood (Lviv and Lutsk) but also in eastern and 
southern Ukraine (Kharkiv and Odessa). Moreover, Poland has sought to stabilise 
the movement of Ukrainians by extending the opportunities for long-term visas. 
Hungary considered its two neighbours with large Hungarian minorities, which are 
still on the EU’s black list (Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro) equally and focused 
on the availability of preferential (five-year multiple entry) visas for the population 
in close family, business, cultural or other contact with Hungary, which primarily 
applied to, but was not explicitly limited to, members of the Hungarian minority 
living in the immediate vicinity of the border.  
 
The disparate paths which various Visegrad states took to solve the issue of visa 
accessibility for the residents of Ukraine and Moldova must be taken into account 
when assessing the feasibility of co-operation in this area. Currently, it appears that 
experience so far indicates deep divides over the expectations that each state 
expresses as to the benefits of potential joint schemes. Poland, which issues more 
visas to Ukrainian residents than the three other states put together, does not look 
forward so much to financial or logistical relief as broader support for its ideas on 
Ukraine’s closer integration into the EU (which the Hungarian government has also 
begun to advocate actively recently). The Czech Republic and Slovakia are primarily 
interested in quick integration into the Schengen system and the abolition of controls 
on internal borders. Hungary and Poland were competing over the location of the 
Agency for the Operational Management of External Borders, seeking support from 
different EU members and demonstrating the independent capacity of their border-
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guard services for effective control of the EU’s outer frontier. In the long run, support 
for the more liberal solutions extended by other EU Member States (e.g. Germany) 
and eventually by the Commission might be needed to remove the reservations of 
some of the V4 states. For instance, it remains to be seen whether the Union’s 
impending limited liberalisation policies towards Ukraine would be important 
signals for both the Czech Republic and Slovakia to maintain their temporary 
asymmetric regimes that were introduced in response to Ukraine’s unilateral 
initiative of April 2005 (introducing a visa waiver for EU nationals). 
 
Nevertheless, continued EU integration has led to intensified technical and 
operational co-operation among the Interior Ministries, Foreign Ministries, Border 
Guards and police forces of the four states, which gave momentum to flagging 
Visegrad co-operation. Many stakeholders confirmed that relations between 
Visegrad countries, which had been rather competitive in the run-up to EU 
membership, have become much more co-operative in the phase of preparation for 
Schengen enlargement. The institutions involved in implementing the JHA and 
Schengen acquis maintain frequent contact both within the Visegrad framework and 
at EU forums (e.g. the VISA group). The four states agreed to submit a single 
application for simultaneous evaluation of compliance with Schengen standards, 
expecting a joint entry in 2007. EU accession has also stimulated the Visegrad Group 
to define some tangible issues in which their common voice would represent added 
value to their national efforts. The common statement by the foreign ministers of the 
four states on the situation in Ukraine, issued on 7 December 2004, and the decision 
to send observers to the vote reflected renewed interest in Ukraine’s stability. 
 
In the short to medium-term, limited, trial forms of on-demand bilateral co-operation 
(exchanging information, forwarding applications, placing helpdesks at another 
state’s consulate) could be introduced in selected locations and areas where such 
schemes would clearly improve access to the visa procedures for a significant 
number of applicants. However, the key question for the feasibility of these partial 
solutions is not the extent to which they improve each of the Visegrad countries’ 
individual policies. Given their clear path to integrate into the Schengen system 
within the next few years, those partial solutions could either be seen as diverting 
resources and efforts from this main goal or as inferior to the proposals that are 
tabled within the EU at large, such as schemes for full representation or establishing 
a common consular policy. Nevertheless, the dampening effect of the recent failures 
of the technocratic path to the further deepening of EU integration, evident in the 
French and Dutch referenda, indicates that partial solutions, based on genuine 
demand from both the affected parties (visa applicants) and the individual member 
states or interest-based coalitions of states (such as member states with the external 
EU border) are still the most certain way forward. 
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
a. Agenda for Visegrad Co-operation on the Path  to Schengen and Beyond  
 
1. Countries that invested in preparations for introducing asymmetric visa 
policies (Hungary and Poland) need to share practical measures, addressing 
considerable challenges such as: logistics, financial loss, need for co-ordination 
among various consulates and training additional staff with the other 
Visegrad states.  The exchange of best practice should take place regularly both 
between ministries (covering required changes in infrastructure, work 
organisation and IT support) and among consuls (sharing daily experience of 
issues such as applicant interview techniques, selection and relations with 
travel agencies, and verification of documents from third countries). 
Asymmetric policies, adopted by Poland and Hungary, have proven to be 
attractive for the other Visegrad states (sending a good political signal to 
Ukraine, facilitating the movement of their own nationals into Ukraine). 
Experience sharing within the V4 setting could encourage other EU states to 
increase the scale of visas issued to Ukrainian and Moldovan nationals.  
 
2. A regional forum of the consular administrations of the Visegrad Group 
should review procedures currently applied by the consulates of the four 
states and draft the Visegrad Consular Professional Standards, setting guidelines 
for customer service aspirations describing an ‘ideal consulate of a Visegrad 
state’ to be implemented upon full Schengen accession. These guidelines 
would  help instill in consular staff a customer service attitude towards 
applicants, indicating the sort of treatment due to potential clients and the 
sources of benefit to the destination state’s economies and societies. Moreover, 
the standards would prepare consular staff for implementing the Common 
Consular Instruction in the spirit of respect towards applicants. 
 
3. A common list of documents required for the submission of applications in all the 
consulates of the four Visegrad countries should be drafted prior to entry into 
Schengen. The agreement would guarantee that, with the exception of justified 
but limited cases (e.g. suspicion of prior involvement in illegal activities), no 
other documents would be demanded by any consular office. The list should 
be made available to applicants through the consulates’ websites, telephone 
information systems, travel agencies and the local media. 
 
4. Fast-track visa application procedures could be created on a pilot basis at 
Visegrad consulates as incentives for travel by high-interest visitors such as 
legitimate business people, professionals, students or researchers. The 
procedures need to cover the entire application process,  starting with online 
registration with fixed appointment times, unambiguous lists of required 
documents, and dedicated times and places for interviews. Feedback from 
travel agencies indicates that dropping visa fees is not sufficient to attract the 
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categories of travellers that are of the greatest interest to the economies and 
societies of the Visegrad states. Once the restricted facilitated solutions are 
proven to be successful in attracting the most desirable visitors and are at the 
same time safe from abuse, they may be extended to all travellers.  
 
5. As part of the alignment of their national systems with Schengen, V4 states 
ought to exchange operational information on persons who are undesirable in each of 
the Group’s states. This information could initially be available on demand and 
in time could be developed into regular sharing of lists of undesirable persons, 
stating the reasons for their inclusion into the record (such as past engagement 
in criminal activities, human trafficking or illegal employment). While that 
information would not bind consuls to a decision, it would provide an 
important ‘alarm signal’ requiring that the case be reviewed and potentially 
checked for reasons for being placed on that list through consular 
consultations. Such an exchange would build up trust among the national 
consular systems and help maintain asymmetric policies after Schengen entry 
by ensuring the high security of those systems, guaranteeing that persons who 
are undesirable in other Visegrad states would not enter any one of them. 
 
6. In the period leading up to full inclusion into the Schengen zone, each of the 
Visegrad states should design their national medium and long-term visa policies 
which would cover the categories of travellers with more permanent ties to 
these countries. National visas for students and academics, business people, 
family members and ethnic compatriots are appropriate tools for maintaining 
people-to-people relations between regions.  
 
7. In turn, measures must be taken to ensure that only genuine tourists or persons 
with explicit and definite short-term reasons for visits receive short-term national 
Schengen visas. As part of preparations for the adoption of the Common 
Consular Instruction, consuls of Visegrad states ought to strive to see each 
applicant and verify his or her actual reason for visiting. Given the consuls’ 
field experience, obligatory interviews for applicants would serve as crucial 
pre-screening mechanisms, helping to eliminate the bulk of unfounded 
applications and limit the number of travellers denied entry only on arrival at 
the border. Consulates should also lead sustained information awareness-
raising campaigns about the Visegrad countries that would balance the tourist 
attractions of those destinations, specific labour market needs for certain types 
of professions and the consequences of illegal residence and employment.   
 
 
 
b. Visegrad Co-operation and Ukraine and Moldova 
 
 
8. In the short- to medium-term, the national authorities from these states ought 
to develop procedures for access of all EU consuls to information on visa 
applicants’ criminal records, places of residence or economic activity status in line 
 8
with the recommendations contained in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. 
Managing a unique identification system for the citizens of Ukraine and 
Moldova needs to be included in the objectives of broader EU assistance to 
those states as part of migration management collaboration. Consuls in both 
Ukraine and Moldova depend on co-operation with those countries’ state 
institutions, such as passport-issuing offices, migration and asylum 
departments of Interior Ministries and Border Guards, and for obtaining 
information on applicants that is otherwise unavailable.  
 
9. A common database of international Ukrainian passports should be made available to 
every EU consul, allowing data to be scanned and the application process for 
customers and consulates to be simplified by providing all the necessary 
information about each traveller. Visegrad states should focus EU assistance 
in the JHA domain to Ukraine and Moldova on developing a trustworthy 
citizens’ register system, including issuing their identification documents 
properly, so as to eliminate the possibility of easily changing personal data. 
Attention must be paid to the issue of persons using multiple passports or 
providing false data as regards their purpose for travelling or accommodation. 
The Visegrad states ought to be interested in setting up this database even 
prior to the extension of the SIS system as not all of them have on-line systems 
integrated with police records that would help identify forged identification 
documents. 
 
10. Visegrad Border Guard services should develop common multilateral programs for 
training their Ukrainian counterparts in detecting forged documents and should 
share their experience in verifying the purpose of trip so as to lower the 
number of persons refused entry or visa cancellations. Visegrad states may 
use the positive experiences of capacity-building and transfer of skills from 
individual (e.g. Hungarian, Polish and Slovak) Border Guard forces to their 
Ukrainian counterparts for making a collective case, not only for the faster 
removal of controls on the temporary Schengen borders but also for dropping 
Ukraine from the visa black list. As the western border of Ukraine becomes a 
full Schengen frontier, Ukrainian Border Guards will be seen as an additional 
barrier to illegal migration and trafficking and Ukraine as a country integrated 
into the EU’s border control system. 
 
 
c. Visegrad Agenda for the EU and Schengen 
 
 
11. Further deeper collaboration could be built on existing successful schemes 
involving other EU members (e.g. the Salzburg Forum or the Baltic states), so 
as to reinforce the notion of the compatibility of multilateral solutions within 
the EU with further integration of Visegrad states in EU common policies, 
including Schengen. By bringing in the ‘old’ EU members. The Visegrad states 
that have pursued more liberal solutions in visa policy (Poland and Hungary) 
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could lower the other new Member States’ apprehension about a likely 
conflict with the larger objective of Schengen accession.  
 
12. Co-operation within the Visegrad Group or other regional settings aimed at 
improving relations with third countries, such as Ukraine or Moldova, must 
include a new communication strategy, presenting possible benefits to each 
participating EU state. The benefits should be expressed in terms of both 
particular national interests (e.g. the issue of ethnic compatriots or 
maintaining economic and social contact across the EU external border) and of 
the bargaining power of the interest-based coalition in the EU of 25. The 
diversity of national foreign policy orientations does not allow for taking the 
support of other states for granted any more, and EU membership opens up to 
all states opportunities for new, interest-based coalitions. 
 
13. It is also necessary to communicate to the EU of 25 the persistent interest of 
Ukraine’s immediate neighbours as well as of the Czech Republic, which has 
extensive experience of Ukrainian immigration, in shaping a balanced 
harmonized visa policy in the framework of  the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Communication with other EU states ought to stress the new Member States’ 
awareness of the specificity of East European cross-border movement, as well 
as their openness to co-operation with other EU Member States. In this 
context, parallels with the policies of other EU states should be shown so as to 
make the solutions practiced by some of the Visegrad states more acceptable 
for consideration by the European Union of 25. 
 
14. The Visegrad Group’s public statements should identify and acknowledge the 
competencies that some of the V4 states have in specific policy areas (e.g. the Czech 
experience in managing labour immigration, the more extensive Polish 
consular network, Hungarian and Slovak policies for the borderland 
communities). They should be communicated to the European Commission 
and ‘old’ EU Member States as part of the Visegrad states’ shared commitment 
to developing ‘friendly border’ policies, which could be the basis for the EU’s 
eastern dimension of eastern policy. New opportunities have appeared for 
‘making the new members’ voices heard’ in the EU at large with the successful 
deployment of regional co-operative efforts (facilitating a peaceful resolution 
to the Ukrainian electoral crisis and sending in observers) among some new 
EU Member States. In turn, the new Member States’ preference for involving 
EU institutions in active ‘eastern diplomacy’, revealed the pivotal role that 
they could play individually and as a group in influencing the content of the 
EU's agenda for Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
15. The states of the Visegrad Group should present the Council and the Commission with 
a proposal for setting fees for Schengen visas at a minimum level. The proposal 
could present the benefits of the visa-waiver programs adopted by all 
Visegrad states towards Ukraine and by Poland towards Moldova. The fact 
that the Visegrad states issue more visas to Ukraine than all the other EU 
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states and yet manage to control illegal migration successfully may be used as 
a persuasive argument for adopting the new members’ national solutions on a 
broader scale. The entry of those states into the Schengen zone is an 
opportunity not only for sharing the ‘old’ members' experience in tight 
controls but also for extending the model of widely-available visas for the 
EU’s eastern neighbours. 
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